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Abstract
J€urgen Habermas is regarded as a central bioconservative commentator in the
debate on the ethics of human prenatal genetic manipulations. While his main
work on this topic, The Future of Human Nature, has been widely examined in
regard to his position on prenatal genetic enhancement, his arguments regard-
ing prenatal genetic therapeutic interventions have for the most part been over-
looked. In this work I do two things. First, I present the three necessary
conditions that Habermas establishes for a prenatal genetic manipulation to be
regarded as morally permissible. Second, I examine if mitochondrial replace-
ment techniques meet these necessary conditions. I investigate, specifically,
the moral permissibility of employing pronuclear transfer and maternal spindle
transfer. I conclude that, according to a Habermasian perspective on prenatal
genetic manipulation, maternal spindle transfer (without using a preselected
sperm and egg) and pronuclear transfer are morally impermissible. Maternal
spindle transfer is, in principle, morally permissible, but only when we have
beforehand preselected a sperm and an egg for our reproductive purpose.
These findings are relevant for bioconservatives, both for those who hold a
Habermasian stance and for those who hold something akin to a Habermasian
stance, because they answer the question: what should bioconservatives do
regarding mitochondrial replacement techniques? In fact, the answer to this
question does not only normatively prescribe what bioconservatives should do
in terms of their personal morality, but it also points towards what kind of legisla-
tion regulatingmitochondrial replacement techniques they should aim at.
INTRODUCTION
How should bioconservatives ethically regard mitochon-
drial replacement techniques (MRTs)?1 If they were to
follow what has been advanced by bioconservative com-
mentators, in both academic journals and media outlets, it
seems that they should forcefully reject them, because
MRTs are a kind of eugenic practice, go against human dig-
nity and are germline modifications.2 The problem with the
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1 This name –mitochondrial replacement techniques –has generated con-
troversy, since it is a misnomer (in actuality it is notmitochondriawhich are
being transferred but nuclear material). See: S.A. Newman. FDA Asked to
Approve Creation of Genetically Modified Children. Huffington Post. 2014.
Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stuart-a-newman/fda-asked-
to-approve-crea_b_4809876.html [accessed 2 April 2014]; S.A. Newman.
Deceptive Labeling of a Radical Embryo Construction Technique. Huffing-
ton Post. 2014. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stuart-a-new-
man/deceptive-labeling-of-a-r_b_6213320.html [Accessed 17 December
2014]; V. Ravitsky, S. Birko, R. Dupras-Leduc. The Three-Parent Baby: A
Case Study of How Language Frames the Ethical Debate Regarding an
Emerging Technology. Am J Bioeth 2015; 15(12): 57–60. For a justification
of why I use the term mitochondrial replacement techniques see C.
Palacios-Gonzalez. Mitochondrial replacement techniques: egg donation,
genealogy and eugenics.Monash Bioeth Rev 2016; 34: 37–51.
2 C. MacKellar. 2014. Should persons affected by mitochondrial disorders not
be brought into existence? BioNews. Available at: http://www.bionews.org.uk/
page_385343.asp [Accessed 13 May 2016]; C. MacKellar. Questions relating
to `mitochondrial replacement. BioNews. Available at: http://www.bionews.
org.uk/page_395064.asp [Accessed 13 May 2016]; S.A. Newman. 2013. The
British Embryo Authority and the Chamber of Eugenics. TheHuffington Post.
[Online]. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stuart-a-newman/
mitochondrial-replacement-ethics_b_2837818.html [Accessed 25 Jan 2016];
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bioconservative assessments that have been presented up to
this date is that they lack philosophical nuance; their nor-
mative conclusions seem to appear out of thin air and to be
unsupported by their premises.
In order to properly understand what bioconservatives
should think about MRTs, and thus to move pass the
simplistic picture that they should reject all genetic bio-
technological interventions directed at human prenatal
life, we need to make a sophisticated and in-depth exami-
nation of these techniques. Exploring MRTs in such a
manner will have two effects. First, those who hold a bio-
conservative position will know, for certain, if MRTs are
morally permissible for them or not, and thus whether
they can resort to them or not. This, for example, is of
paramount relevance for women who are bioconserva-
tives, want to have genetically related children, want to
be morally consistent, and suffer from mitochondrial
DNA diseases. Additionally, bioconservatives will have a
clear picture of what kind of regulation they should aim
for regarding MRTs. Second, by presenting a proper
account of the bioconservative position those that hold a
liberal one can better challenge it. This is important if
we want to avoid being self-serving and fighting a straw
man. It bears noticing that up to this date the liberal dis-
cussion on the ethics of MRTs, specifically maternal
spindle transfer (MST) and pronuclear transfer (PNT),
has been dominated by issues of identity,3 transgenera-
tional health risks4, the disclosure of MRT conception,5
genealogical ancestry,6 and first in-human use.7
Now, in this article I explore the morality of MRTs
from a bioconservative position, specifically from a
Habermasian one, thus filling an important gap in the
academic literature. It is true that there is a diverse array
of bioconservative positions concerning human cloning
and human prenatal genetic manipulations that could be
applied to the case of MRTs, for example those of San-
del,8 Annas9 or Kass.10 Even though this is the case I
focus on Habermass stance because his is the most
sophisticated: the depth of his analysis makes The Future
of Human Nature an unparalleled work, among the con-
servative ones.11
At this point I want to make an important methodo-
logical clarification. This work does not aim at criticising
Habermass stance on human prenatal genetic enhancing
manipulations or human prenatal genetic therapeutic
manipulations.12 I take Habermass position regarding
human prenatal genetic therapeutic manipulations at
face value and explore how MRTs would fit into it. This
entails two things. First, those who reject Habermass
stance on both enhancing and therapeutic genetic prena-
tal manipulations should regard this work as an exercise
in Habermass logic. Second, and most importantly,
what follows from my analysis normatively binds biocon-
servatives who hold Habermass position as true and
thus they should endorse such findings, both as a matter
of personal morality and in the development of
regulation.
This article has three sections. In the first one I pro-
vide a scientific overview of mitochondrial diseases and
present two of the methods (PNT and MST) that could
be employed to allow women affected by a mitochon-
drial DNA (mtDNA) disease to have genetically related
children free from this disease.13 In the second section I
present and explore the three necessary conditions that
Habermas establishes in The Future of Human Nature for
prenatal genetic therapeutic interventions to be regarded
as morally permissible. In the third section I explore the
moral permissibility of employing PNT and MST from a
Habermasian perspective.
F. Baylis. The ethics of creating children with three genetic parents. Reprod
BiomedOnline 2013; 26(6): 531–534.
3 A. Wrigley, S. Wilkinson, J.B. Appleby. Mitochondrial Replacement:
Ethics and Identity.Bioethics 2015; 29(9): 631–8.
4 J.B. Appleby. The ethical challenges of the clinical introduction of mito-
chondrial replacement techniques.Med Health Care Philos 2015; 18(4): 501–
14; Baylis. op. cit. note 2;M.H. Johnson. Tri-parenthood–a simplymisleading
term or an ethically misguided approach?Reprod Biomed Online 2013; 26(6):
516–9; A.L. Bredenoord, W. Dondorp, G. Pennings, G. De Wert. Avoiding
transgenerational risks of mitochondrial DNA disorders: a morally accepta-
ble reason for sex selection?HumReprodOxfEngl 2010; 25(6): 1354–60.
5 Appleby. op. cit. note 4; J. Harris. GermlineManipulation andOur Future
Worlds. AJOB 2015; 15(12): 30–34; J. Harris. Germline Modification and
the Burden of Human Existence. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2016; 25(1): 6–18;
I. deMelo-Martin I.When theMilkofHumanKindness Becomes aLuxury
(andUntested) Good. AReply to Harris Unconditional Embrace ofMito-
chondrial Replacement Techniques.CambQHealthc EthicsForthcoming; J.
Harris. How to Welcome New Technologies: Some Comments on Inmacu-
lada De Melo-Martin. Camb Q Healthc Ethics Forthcoming; C. Palacios-
Gonzalez. Resource Allocation, Treatment, Disclosure, and Mitochondrial
Replacement Techniques: Some Comments on deMelo-Martin and Harris.
CambQHealthc EthicsForthcoming.
6 Baylis. op. cit. note 2.
7 A.L. Bredenoord, P. Braude. Ethics of mitochondrial gene replace-
ment: from bench to bedside.BMJ 2010; 341(nov08 1): c6021–c6021.
8 M.J. Sandel. 2009. The Case Against Perfection. Cambridge, Mass:
Belknap Press.
9 G.J. Annas. Why we should ban human cloning. N Engl J Med 1998;
339(2): 122–5.
10 L.R. Kass. Wisdom of Repugnance:WhyWe Should Ban the Cloning
of Humans,The. Valpso Univ Law Rev 1998; 32(2): 679–705.
11 J. Habermas. 2003. The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge, UK:
Polity Press.
12 For a recent critique of Habermass arguments against genetic prena-
tal enhancing interventions see, J. Pugh. Autonomy, Natality and Free-
dom: A Liberal Re-examination of Habermas in the Enhancement
Debate.Bioethics 2015; 29(3): 145–52.
13 For a good summary of the regulatory discussions surrounding
MRTs in the US and UK see, Appleby op. cit. note 4; I.G. Cohen, J.
Savulescu, E.Y. Adashi. Transatlantic lessons in regulation of mitochon-
drial replacement therapy. Science 2015; 348(6231): 178–80.
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MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT
TECHNIQUES
Mitochondria are cellular organelles that generate the
energy cells need to work properly. They are character-
ized by: a) being only maternally inherited,14 and b) pos-
sessing their own DNA. Mitochondrial DNA comprises
0.1% of the total human DNA material; nuclear DNA
comprises the other 99.9%.15
Mitochondrial diseases occur when mitochondria do
not work properly. Problems in the mitochondria can be
intrinsic to it or externally caused. Intrinsic problems are
caused when there are deleterious mutations in the
mtDNA that cause these organelles not to generate the
adequate levels of energy for cells to work properly.
These mutations can occur spontaneously during
mtDNA replication or they can be inherited. A genetic
deleterious mutation (or set of mutations) can occur
across all mitochondrial genomes in a body, referred to
as homoplasmy; or they can occur only in some mito-
chondria, known as heteroplasmy.16 While homoplas-
mic mothers will always pass the homoplasmic condition
to their children, children from heteroplasmic mothers
will inherit a mix of mutant deleterious mitochondria
and healthy mitochondria. How serious a mtDNA dis-
ease will be, or if it will manifest at all, is related both to
the type of mutation affecting the mtDNA and to the
amount of deleterious mutant mitochondria. Addition-
ally, externally caused problems can occur when genes in
the cells nuclear DNA affect mitochondrial function.17
Mitochondrial DNA diseases are not one disease, but a
group of neuromuscular diseases that range in their
effects from mild to devastating. Heart and major organ
failure, dementia, stroke, blindness, deafness, infant ence-
phalopathy, Lebers hereditary optic neuropathy, and
premature death can all be caused by mtDNA diseases.18
According to the UK Department of Health, one in
every 6,500 children in the UK is born with a mtDNA
disease.19
At this time there is no cure for mtDNA diseases. The
standard treatment is to address the symptoms so as to
increase the patients wellbeing. This means that women
who possess mtDNA diseases, know about their condition,
and want to reproduce without passing on the mtDNA dis-
ease, face a complicated reproductive decision. Those who
are homoplasmic carriers know that any genetically related
child they have will inherit the homoplasmic characteristic.
Those who are heteroplasmic know that there is a probabil-
ity that their genetically related children could possess a
deleterious mutant load that, if high enough, would cause
the disease to manifest. Given these scenarios, women who
are carriers must choose between having genetically related
children (i.e. using their eggs) and face the possibility of
passing on a mtDNA disease, or they can choose other
reproductive options (e.g. egg or embryo donation).20 A
third option has recently emerged. Scientists have conceived
two different methods that would allow women with
mtDNA diseases to have genetically related children with-
out deleteriously mutant mitochondria: maternal spindle
transfer (MST) and pronuclear transfer (PNT). It is impor-
tant to stress that these techniques only tackle mtDNA dis-
eases, and thus all my further discussion is narrowed to a
discussion of MRTs and mtDNA diseases.21
Maternal spindle transfer (MST): assisted reproductive
techniques are used to obtain eggs from the intending
mother and a donor.22 The eggs from the mother possess
14 The advent of in vitro gametogenesis could change this fact. If func-
tional oocytes were to be generated from males then mitochondria
could, in such cases, be inherited from the genetic father that provided
the cell from which the egg was derived. C. Palacios-Gonzalez, J. Harris,
G. Testa. Multiplex parenting: IVG and the generations to come. J Med
Ethics 2014; 40(11): 752–8.
15 R.W. Taylor, G.A. Taylor, S.E. Durham,D.M. Turnbull. The determi-
nation of complete humanmitochondrial DNA sequences in single cells:
implications for the study of somatic mitochondrial DNA point muta-
tions.Nucleic Acids Res 2001; 29(15): e74–e74.
16 Throughout the text I will use the term homoplasmic mothers to refer to
thosewomenwhoare homoplasmic for adeleteriousmutationof themtDNA.
17 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 2012. Novel techniques for the preven-
tion of mitochondrial DNA disorders: an ethical review. London: Nuffield
Council on Bioethics: vii.
18 Department of Health (DH). 2014. Mitochondrial Donation: A con-
sultation on draft regulations to permit the use of new treatment techniques
to prevent the transmission of a serious mitochondrial disease from mother
to child. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/285251/mitochondrial_donation_consul-
tation_document_24_02_14_Accessible_V0.4.pdf [Accessed 5 Jan 2015]
19 A.M. Schaefer, R. McFarland, E.L. Blakely, L. He, R.G. Whittaker,
R.W. Taylor, et al. Prevalence of mitochondrial DNA disease in adults.Ann
Neurol 2008; 63(1): 35–9; Department ofHealth (DH). op. cit. note 18.
20 It has been suggested that preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)
can be used for selecting embryos that do not possess a deleterious
mutant mtDNA load to the point of clinical expression of the disease.
The problem with this proposal is that is useless for homoplasmic
women, and that it only serves heteroplasmic women, at this point, if
there is enough data on the specific mtDNA mutation. PGD would not
be useful for mutations that are uncommon or private. H.J. Smeets, S.C.
Sallevelt, J.C. Dreesen, C.E. de Die-Smulders, I.F. de Coo. Preventing
the transmission of mitochondrial DNA disorders using prenatal or pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis.AnnNYAcad Sci 2015; 1350:29–36.
21 L. Craven, H.A. Tuppen, G.D. Greggains, S.J. Harbottle, J.L. Mur-
phy, L.M. Cree, et al. Pronuclear transfer in human embryos to prevent
transmission of mitochondrial DNA disease. Nature 2010; 465(7294):
82–5; M. Tachibana, M. Sparman, H. Sritanaudomchai, H. Ma, L.
Clepper, J. Woodward, et al. Mitochondrial gene replacement in primate
offspring and embryonic stem cells. Nature 2009; 461(7262): 367–72; A.
Yabuuchi, Z. Beyhan, N. Kagawa, C. Mori, K. Ezoe, K. Kato, et al. Pre-
vention of mitochondrial disease inheritance by assisted reproductive
technologies: Prospects and challenges.Biochim Biophys Acta BBA - Gen
Subj 2012; 1820(5): 637–42.
22 Here I will not discuss if the mitochondrial donor is or is not a
mother. For a discussion of such issue see, J.B. Appleby. Should mito-
chondrial donation be anonymous? J Med Philos Forthcoming; R.
Brandt. Mitochondrial donation and the right to know. J Med
Ethics Published Online First 2016; 1–8 medethics–2016–103587; M.
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deleterious mutant mitochondria while those from the
donor do not. Afterwards the chromosomes, which are
found on one side of the egg in a spindle-shaped group,
of both eggs are removed. The mothers chromosomes
are transferred to the now enucleated donors egg. The
donors chromosomes are discarded along with the moth-
ers enucleated egg. At this point the reconstructed egg
has healthy mitochondria and can be fertilized in vitro
and then transferred into the mother or a surrogate (if
there were reasons for the mother not to carry the preg-
nancy). The healthy mitochondria of the reconstructed
oocyte will be passed down via the maternal line to subse-
quent generations, thereby cutting off the transmission of
mitochondrial disease (so long as the chromosomes
transfer process does not carry enough deleterious
mutant mitochondria to cause heteroplasmy to the point
of clinical expression of the disease).23
Pronuclear transfer (PNT): two zygotes are created in
vitro. One of them is created with the intending parents
sperm and egg (or a donors sperm and the mothers
egg), and another with a donated egg and the fathers (or
donors) sperm. After the sperm has fertilized the oocyte,
and during the first hours, the nuclear material of both
progenitors is enclosed in different membranes that are
called the male and female pronuclei. The two pronuclei
are removed from both zygotes at day one in their devel-
opment, and prior to their fusion. The intending parents
(or donors and mothers) pronuclei are then transferred
to the enucleated zygote produced with the donors egg.
The reconstructed cell is then transferred into the mother
or a surrogate (the resulting child would be free from
mitochondrial disease as long as the chromosomes trans-
fer process does not carry enough deleterious mutant
mitochondria to cause heteroplasmy to the point of clini-
cal expression of the disease). Finally, the other pronuclei
and the enucleated zygote produced with the intending
mothers egg are discarded.24
HABERMAS ON PRENATAL GENETIC
INTERVENTIONS
A common topic in the human enhancement debate is
whether there is a moral difference between prenatal
genetic therapeutic interventions and prenatal genetic
enhancing interventions. Most liberal commentators argue
that there is no moral difference between them and that in
principle we should accept, or reject, both as ethically
sound. For example, when discussing whether the notion
of disease is able to ground a moral distinction between
genetic therapeutic interventions and genetic enhancement
interventions Nicholas Agar claims that:
The case for allowing prospective parents access to
some therapeutic goods seems very strong indeed.
Though gene therapy may potentially be a more effec-
tive means of combating diabetes than daily shots of
insulin, it does not seem in a different moral category.
Here is where the stand against eugenics is taken. If
gene therapy is medicine then it should be restricted
to the treatment of disease. It may be all very well to
seek to correct flaws in the execution of divine or evo-
lutionary design, but its a different thing altogether to
shape people according to our own designs. Liberals
are united in contempt for the above reasoning [empha-
sis added]. They doubt that the notion of disease is up
to the moral theoretic task the therapeutic/eugenic dis-
tinction requires of it.25
Contrary to this position, Habermas argues that there
is a morally relevant distinction between prenatal genetic
therapeutic interventions and prenatal genetic enhancing
interventions. He argues, throughout The Future of
Human Nature, that while genetic therapeutic interventions
are morally acceptable under certain circumstances, genetic
enhancing interventions26 are not morally permissible:
Piotrowska, M. Why Is An Egg Donor a Genetic Parent, But Not a
Mitochondrial Donor? Camb QHealthc Ethics Forthcoming.
23 NuffieldCouncil on Bioethics. op. cit. note 17; Tachibana, Sparman, Sri-
tanaudomchai, Ma, Clepper, Woodward, et al. op. cit. note 21; L.A.
Hyslop, P. Blakeley, L. Craven, et al. Towards Clinical Application of
Pronuclear Transfer to Prevent Mitochondrial DNADisease.Nature 2016;
534(7607): 383–386; M. Yamada, V. Emmanuele, M.J. Sanchez-Quintero,
et al. Genetic Drift Can Compromise Mitochondrial Replacement by
Nuclear Transfer inHumanOocytes.Cell StemCell 2016; 18(6): 749–54.
24 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. op. cit. note 17; Craven, Tuppen,
Greggains, Harbottle, Murphy, Cree, et al. op. cit. note 21.
25 N. Agar. Liberal Eugenics.Public Aff Q 1998; 12(2): 141.
26 Although in this article I focus onHabermass account of prenatal genetic
therapeutic interventions I will briefly mention his two main arguments (as
identified by Jonathan Pugh) against prenatal genetic enhancing interventions:
the empirical argument and the argument from natality. First, the empirical
argument holds that a prenatally genetically enhanced child might feel un-
free to carry on what she has chosen as a life-project, because the enhancing
intervention generates parental expectations regarding which life-project she
must follow. The child might come to believe that since she incarnates her
parents expectations she cannot do otherwise than that that is expected from
her. Second, the argument from natality holds that the autonomy of prena-
tally genetically enhanced children would be undermined, in that the children
would not be able to regard themselves as autonomous agents. ForHabermas
an agent can only regard herself as autonomous if there was a time when she
was not subject to the social forces that determine her self, this time is the
time before she was born. For a person to be himself, a point of reference is
required which goes back beyond the lines of tradition and the contexts of
interactionwhich constitute the process of formation throughwhich personal
identity is moulded in the course of a life history. Habermas. op. cit. note 11,
p. 59. Someone could posit that the arguments that Habermas presents
against prenatal genetic enhancing interventions could be applied to prenatal
genetic therapeutic interventions. This strategy would be unsuccessful if pre-
natal genetic therapeutic interventions: a) did not impose a parental expecta-
tion regarding a specific life-project unto a child, and b) did not import any
value that could affect the prenatal self. Now, it seems that prenatal genetic
therapeutic interventions in fact do not impose aparental expectation regard-
ing a specific life-project; but, on the other hand, it is true that our concept of
health is not value-free, in that it is, at least partly, determined by social values.
Habermas could escape this criticism if he acknowledged that in our dealings
with prenatal life we cannot escape to always bring with us our conception of
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The threshold separating negative and positive
eugenics can be described in terms of a difference of
attitudes. In the framework of clinical practice, the
genetic therapist treats the living being on the basis
of a justifiably assumed consensus, as if the embryo
were already the second person which it will one day
become. Conversely, the genetic designer assumes
both an optimizing and an instrumentalizing attitude
toward the embryo: the eight cell embryos genetic
composition is to be improved according to subjec-
tive preferences. What takes the place of the per-
formative attitude toward a future person, who in its
embryonic state is already treated as a person who
can say yes or no, is in the case of positive eugenics
a hybrid combination of objectivating attitudes.27
Thus, the first condition that must be met for prenatal
genetic interventions to be regarded as morally permissi-
ble is that they are of a therapeutic kind and that they
are guided by a clinical attitude.
Given that the therapist treats the embryo as a second
person, it is not sufficient for the intervention to be thera-
peutic and carried out according to what Habermas calls
the logic of healing for it to be morally permissible. Why
not? Because standard medical practice requires that
patients provide their informed consent to receive therapies.
This being the case, there is a substantive problem:
embryos cannot provide their informed consent. Haber-
mas solves this problem by relying on the notion of
justifiable assumed consensus which means presumed
informed consent. According to him, it is morally permis-
sible to carry out genetic therapeutic interventions if we
can assume, counterfactually, that the embryo would agree
to the intervention if it had the required capacities: [the]
clinical attitude draws its legitimizing force from the well-
founded counterfactual assumption of a possible consen-
sus reached with another person who is capable of saying
yes or no.28 This counterfactual assumption position is
mostly novel in medical ethics, since the discussion of
incapacity and patients best interests is what has domi-
nated the Anglophone debate so far.29
The second condition that must be met for a prenatal
genetic intervention to be regarded as morally permissi-
ble is that we are able, counterfactually, to presume the
embryos informed consent for it.
Even if we accept presumed informed consent as
morally unproblematic in the case of life saving treat-
ments, there is a degree of intervention issue that must be
acknowledged. How serious should a condition be for pre-
sumed consent to be legitimate? For example, how can we
know that an embryo would not, counterfactually, reject a
genetic treatment? Could a therapist presume consent for
modifying genes that are related to being below average
height? Habermas answers this question by asserting that
we can presume consent if the genetic intervention aims at
addressing conditions that are unequivocally extreme and
that would be rejected by all. He writes that only in the
negative case of the prevention of extreme and highly gen-
eralized evils may we have good reasons to assume that
the person concerned would consent to the eugenic
goal,30 and [i]n any case, assumed consensus can only be
invoked for the goal of avoiding evils which are unques-
tionably extreme and likely to be rejected by all.31 Haber-
mass response sidesteps problematic cases, for example
genetic therapy aimed at increasing height, but it is useful
for the discussion of the morality of MRTs.
Finally, the third condition that must be met for pre-
natal genetic interventions to be regarded as morally per-
missible is that we aim at preventing extreme evils that
would likely be rejected by all.
At this point we should ask if both therapeutic genetic
germline interventions and therapeutic genetic somatic
interventions could be morally acceptable for Habermas.
The first thing to say is that in The Future of Human
Nature he does not explicitly address the moral differen-
ces between somatic and germline interventions:
I will not go into the more specific questions of the
moral responsibility we would have to take, with
respect to a possible modification of the germ line, for
the far-reaching intergenerational effects of germ line
therapy (banned, as yet), or even for the secondary
effects of body cell therapy (. . .) In the following, I will
refer, without further specification, to genetic inter-
ventions which are carried before birth.32
However, when he discusses the ethics of PGD he tells
us that: A genetic manipulation (carried out, preferably, on
somatic cells [emphasis added]) restricted to clearly thera-
peutic goals can be compared to the combat against epi-
demics and other widespread diseases.33 From this quote
what is a good life. If he did this then he would have to renounce to the argu-
ment fromnatality in its present form. See, Pugh. op. cit. note 12.
27 Habermas. op. cit. note 11, p. 96–97.
28 Ibid: 43.
29 Two caveats should be mentioned in regard to presumed informed con-
sent. First, doctors cannot resort to presumed informed consent to start or
carryon treatmentwhen patients have properlymanifested their autonomous
will not to receive any treatment, or some types of treatments, and healthcare
professionals know about this, for example, in the case of do not resuscitate
orders. Second, the legal justificatory reasons for health care professionals to
act, on specific circumstances, can, or not, be grounded on the notion of pre-
sumed informed consent. For example, in the UK doctors legal justification
for intervening when patients cannot provide their informed consent is not
presumed informed consent but rather patients best interests, as established
in the Mental Capacity Act: Department of Health. 2005. Mental Capacity
Act. London,HMSO: Sect. 4–5.
30 Habermas. op. cit. note 11, p. 63.
31 Ibid: 43.
32 Ibid: 117.
33 Ibid: 69–70.
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it is clear that Habermas is not outright rejecting34 germline
prenatal manipulations. He is only asserting that it would
be preferable that the interventions are carried out on a
somatic level. Given that Habermas does not outright
reject germline modifications the question that we must
answer is: should we regard MRTs that amount to germ-
line prenatal manipulations as morally permissible?
If we suppose that MRTs are effective, and that the
three previous conditions are met, then it would be
morally permissible, other things being equal, to select for
females when employing them (lets remember that mito-
chondria are only inherited via the maternal line and thus
when we select for females the donated mitochondria
will be passed on to future generations, if they reproduce).
It would be morally permissible because the primary aim
is treating someone with a serious condition that causes
pain and suffering, whereas the heredity effect is only an
unintended side effect of the procedure.35
MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT
TECHNIQUES: A HABERMASIAN
PERSPECTIVE
At this point we can investigate the morality of both
MRTs from a Habermasian perspective.36 The first step
is to try to situate these techniques either in the therapy
or in the enhancement category. At first glance it appears
that both PNT and MST fall, undoubtedly, within the
therapy category. Why? Because scientists seem to be
guided by a clinical attitude and both techniques have
been presented as prenatal cures for mtDNA diseases, in
addition to the fact that the use of MST and PNT is not
aimed to enhance any children or to create any enhanced
children. At this point we are tempted to conclude that
the use of MST and PNT is motivated by what Haber-
mas calls the logic of healing and thus that both techni-
ques pass the therapy/enhancement test. The problem
with this reasoning is that in fact only PNT and an
instance of MST can be guided by the logic of healing;
given that the logic of healing requires to be directed at
someone in specific. It requires this in as much as
healing is a comparative term, and we can only com-
pare states of existing individuals or individuals that have
existed. In short, healing entails healing someone. PNT
can be guided by the logic of healing because it occurs
when there is already an embryo to act upon, and thus
one that can be healed.
The instance of MST which can be guided by the logic
of healing is that where we have preselected a specific
egg and sperm for our reproductive purpose before any
procedure takes place and before we even consider carry-
ing out the procedure. When we have already preselected
a pair of gametes, under these circumstances, we can
heal someone at the gametic stage because the prese-
lected egg and sperm will always create the same specific
individual. All other cases of MST cannot be considered
as guided by the logic of healing because there is no spe-
cific individual to be healed. On the contrary, we would
create someone with a mtDNA deleterious mutant free
reconstructed egg. This is predicated on the belief that
our identity is tied to the specific gametes that gave rise
to ourselves. Let me explain this point more clearly:
when we carry out MST we have a preselected egg, lets
assume, but we do not know which sperm will fertilize it.
We do not know this because which sperm will fertilize
the reconstructed egg is dependent on a series of highly
mutable factors, for example the amount of healthy
sperm found in the sample, the time of collection of the
sample, etc. This means that the selection of the sperm
will determine who comes into existence, and thus prior
to such selection, if it takes place, no specific individual
can be said to be healed.
In conclusion, PNT and MST with preselected
gametes (henceforth MSTpg) pass the therapy/
enhancement test, falling on the therapy side. On the
other hand, MST without preselected sperm (hence-
forth MSTwps) falls neither on the therapy side nor
on the enhancement side. It falls under the scope of
negative eugenics understood as improving the gene
pool by reducing the prevalence of (people with) sub-
normal traits (health-related or otherwise).37 Does
this mean that a Habermasian stance on prenatal
genetic therapy cannot account for MSTwps? In a
strict sense it cannot. Throughout The Future of
34 If Habermas were to reject all prenatal genetic therapeutic germline
modifications then what would follow is that the final conclusion of the
article would be restricted to cases of selecting for males. Lets remember
that mitochondria are only inherited via the maternal line, so choosing
for maleswould amount to a kind of somatic manipulation.
35 An alternative solution to this germline problem can be provided by
David Boonins treatment of the Non-identity Problem. See D. Boonin.
How to Solve theNon-Identity Problem.Public AffQ 2008; 22(2): 129–59.
36 A central theme inHabermassThe Future of HumanNature is the ethical
self-understanding of the species, forwhich hemeans thatwe regard ourselves
as creatures that are both grown andmade.We are grown insofar as ourmen-
tal and physical capacities are not determined by others actions. We are
made in that others, and ourselves, can and do exercise control over our lives
and capacities. See D. Gunson.What Is the Habermasian Perspective in Bio-
ethics? Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2012; 21(2): 190. In this article I will not dis-
cuss the relation between the ethical self-understanding of the species and
MRTs. I will not do so because for Habermas the ethical self-understanding
of the species is at stake when instrumentalization of the prepersonal life
occurs, and this is not the case when we carry on prenatal genetic therapeutic
interventions: What is at stake, therefore, with the instrumentalization of pre-
personal life [by means of genetic engineering] is the ethical self-
understanding of the species, which is crucial for whether wemaygo on to see
ourselves as beings committed to moral judgement and action. Habermas.
op. cit. note 11, p. 71. It must be said that even when PNT uses human
embryos for the sake of other human embryos, this is not the kind of instru-
mentalization thatHabermas is exploring in the previous quote.
37 S. Wilkinson. 2010. Choosing Tomorrows Children: The Ethics of
Selective Reproduction. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press; 191.
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Human Nature Habermas only deals with technologies
that can be applied at the embryonic stage, and this is
a theoretical limitation of Habermass account when
considered against the broader topic of genetic
engineering.
One technique that comes to mind when talking about
a preselected sperm and egg for our reproductive pur-
poses is intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), which
could be used after MST. In this technique a single
sperm is selected and injected into the cytoplasm of an
egg, which is then transferred to the intending mother or
a surrogate. In order to establish if ICSI would satisfy
the conditions of MSTpg what we need to examine is
whether the gamete selection occurs before any proce-
dure takes place and before we even consider carrying
out the procedure. Establishing if these conditions are
met is important, because if they are not then the deci-
sion to employ ICSI causally affects which sperm will be
selected, and thus who will be brought into existence.
When these conditions are not met employing ICSI, after
MST, is equal to MSTwps, since we do not know the
identity of the sperm that will fertilize the egg.
Now, the second step is to examine if PNT and MSTpg
would prevent extreme and highly generalized evils and
therefore be considered as morally permissible. There is
not a straightforward answer to this question, given that
the effects of mtDNA diseases vary from mild to devas-
tating. It should be clear that it would be morally permis-
sible to use MSTpg and PNT to avoid the devastating
versions of mtDNA diseases. However, even when PNT
and MSTpg can be morally employed in order to avoid
extreme evils there is a problem regarding the moral per-
missibility of their use in other instances. The problem is
that we are unable to accurately predict what degree of
evil, if any, an individual will suffer as a result of having
a deleterious mutant load of mitochondria. This means
that, for most cases, we do not know if the use of MSTpg
or PNT counters the occurrence of mild, moderate, or
devastating evils. We do know that homoplasmic mothers
will always pass the deleterious mutant mitochondria to
their genetic offspring, but we are unable to ascertain if
the children will be symptomatic or asymptomatic,
although there is a high probability of symptoms develop-
ing. The case of heteroplasmic mothers is even more diffi-
cult. We cannot accurately predict the gravity of the
disease that children of heteroplasmic mothers would
develop, if any, or the degree of deleterious mutant load
that they will possess.38
Someone could propose the use of preimplantation
genetic diagnosis (PGD) to investigate the status of the
deleterious mutant load and then allow, or not, the use
of PNT and MSTpg. The problem with this option is
that PGD involves extracting a cell from an embryo that
has passed the one-cell stage, and then testing it.39
Resorting to PGD necessarily implies that we would be
unable to afterwards use MSTpg or PNT, because
MSTpg takes place before fertilization and PNT takes
place at the one-cell stage. Therefore, PGD would not
serve as an adequate tool to indicate the moral permissi-
bility of carrying out MSTpg or PNT. We must conclude,
at this point, that, from a Habermasian perspective, it
would only be morally permissible to use PNT or MSTpg
when we know, accurately and in advance, that an
extreme evil would be prevented by such techniques.40
A second theoretical shortcoming of Habermass posi-
tion is manifest when dealing with genetic conditions
that appear within a spectrum that ranges from mild to
devastating. It seems that Habermas is oblivious to the
fact that most genetic conditions manifest in varying
degrees due to other intrinsic and extrinsic factors. For
example, the genes BRAC1 and BRAC2 have been asso-
ciated with breast and ovarian cancer, but their presence
does not mean that cancer will necessarily ensue.41 If we
agree with Habermass thoughts on the severity threshold,
then we would have to accept that it would be morally
impermissible to carry out prenatal genetic therapy to
alter these genes, if this was possible. Habermass theo-
retical shortcoming is that for all genetic conditions that
manifest within a spectrum, we cannot morally intervene
if we do not accurately and a priori know how great the
evil will be. This means that most of the time we would
be morally unable to intervene with prenatal genetic ther-
apy, even if afterwards the condition revealed itself to be
devastating.
So far it seems that in most cases MSTpg and PNT
should be regarded as morally impermissible. While this
is the case in my above take on Habermass work, I think
there is an alternative position that would allow for a
more liberal use of PNT and MSTpg. Throughout The
Future of Human Nature Habermas alternates between
two positions for allowing prenatal genetic therapeutic
interventions. The first position, to which Habermas
gives substantial weight, was just presented. According
to this one, prenatal genetic therapies can be considered
as morally permissible only if they will prevent extreme
evils.42 The main problem with this position, as I have
explained, is that it rules out therapeutic interventions
38 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. op. cit. note 17. p. vii.
39 S.C. Sallevelt, J.C. Dreesen,M. Dr€usedau, S. Spierts, E. Coonen, F.H.
van Tienen, et al. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis in mitochondrial
DNA disorders: challenge and success. JMed Genet 2013; 50(2): 125–32.
40 Sallevelt, Dreesen, Dr€usedau, Spierts, Coonen, van Tienen, et al. op.
cit. note 39; A.L. Bredenoord, W. Dondorp, G. Pennings, C. de Die-
Smulders, B. Smeets, G. de Wert. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis for
mitochondrial DNA disorders: ethical guidance for clinical practice. Eur
J HumGenet 2009; 17(12): 1550–9.
41 T. Pal, J. Permuth-Wey, J.A. Betts, J.P. Krischer, J. Fiorica, H. Arango,
et al. BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations account for a large proportion of
ovarian carcinoma cases.Cancer 2005; 104(12): 2807–16.
42 Habermas. op. cit. note 11, p. 43,63, 91.
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for conditions that could cause extreme evils, because of
the uncertainty that they will actually do so. This posi-
tion is incapable of dealing with the concept of risk,
because Habermass is mainly thinking of monogenetic
diseases.43 I contend that this position is too demanding
and that Habermas would agree to therapeutically alter
genes associated with diseases such as, for example, can-
cer if the interventions were safe enough.
The second position, which I consider is more tenable
but less explored within The Future of Human Nature, is
that the threshold for accepting prenatal genetic thera-
peutic interventions as morally permissible is related to
the fact that they would prevent evils likely to be rejected
by everybody.44 If we accept this position as correct then
we can conclude that it would be morally permissible to
carry out MSTpg and PNT in order to avoid mtDNA
diseases. It would be so because both techniques would
prevent unmistakeable evils that are likely to be rejected
by all, but more importantly that seem to be rejected by
those currently affected by mtDNA diseases.
Three things should be noted at this time. First, Hab-
ermas is endorsing a bad-difference view of disabilities,
since he characterizes the effects of genetic conditions as
evils.45 Second, this second position would reject remov-
ing the genetic causes of deafness (a paradigmatic study
case within medical ethics) given that such condition is
not likely to be rejected by all.46 Third, it is true that cer-
tain people oppose MST and PNT, but the point here is
not whether they oppose these techniques, but whether
they oppose the evils caused by mtDNA diseases.
The third step is to ask if we can, counterfactually,
assume the embryoss consent for the prenatal genetic
therapy. While I previously quoted Habermas stating
that consent can only be presumed for the prevention of
extreme evils47 in another place he also maintains that
[a]s long as medical intervention is guided by the clinical
goal of healing a disease or of making provisions for a
healthy life, the person carrying out the treatment may
assume that he has the consent of the patient preven-
tively treated.48 This means that we can presume
informed consent for the prevention of non-extreme evils
when our actions are guided by the clinical goal of heal-
ing or of making provisions for a healthy life. Now, given
that genetic therapists are guided by the logic of healing
when treating mtDNA diseases, with PNT and MSTpg,
then we can, counterfactually, assume the embryos con-
sent. We can do so if we accept Habermass second posi-
tion on establishing the validity of presumed consent,
and reject the first one.
At this point we can conclude that, according to a
Habermasian perspective on prenatal genetic therapeutic
interventions, MSTpg and PNT (for selecting males and
females) are morally permissible, and that MSTwps falls
outside Habermass theoretical framework as presented
in The Future of Human Nature. It is very important to
acknowledge a caveat about the above conclusion: it was
reached without taking into account Habermass discus-
sion of the value of human prepersonal life. In order to
have a complete picture of the morality of MRTs, from a
Habermasian perspective, we would need to include his
stance on this issue.
Contrary to some conservative positions, Habermas
does not consider that the human embryo is a person
from the moment of conception. According to him a
human being becomes a person when she enters into the
public sphere of a linguistic community: “As a member
of a species, as a specimen of a community of procrea-
tion, the genetically individuated child in utero is by no
means a fully fledged person from the very beginning.49
[emphasis added]. Notwithstanding this assertion, Haber-
mas does not think that human embryos can be liberally
used for medical research, or included in the balancing
of competing goods.50 Why? Because he maintains that
human embryos human life possesses certain value; a
value that does not make them inviolable but that never-
theless makes them to qualify as beings that should not
be disposed over:
Both sides [of the abortion debate], it seems, fail to
see that something may be not for us to dispose
over and yet not have the status of a legal person
who is a subject of inalienable human rights as
defined by the constitution. It does not solely belong
to human dignity to qualify as not to be disposed
over [unverf€ugbar]. Something may, for good
moral reasons, be not for us to dispose over and still
not be inviolable [unantastbar] in the sense of the
unrestricted or absolute validity of fundamental
rights (which is constitutive for human dignity as
defined in Article 1 of the Basic Law).51
Habermass distinction between inviolability and not
to be disposed over (here we should understand not to
be disposed over as not to use)52 seems to allow him to
43 Ibid: 21.
44 Ibid: 12, 51, 52.
45 According to Elizabeth Barnes the bad-difference view maintains
that disability is by itself something that makes you worse off (. . .) [while
for the] mere-difference views of disability, having a disability makes you
nonstandard or different, but it doesnt by itself make you worse off. E.
Barnes. Valuing Disability, CausingDisability. Ethics 2014; 125(1): 89.
46 R. Cooper. Can It Be a Good Thing to Be Deaf? J Med Philos 2007;
32(6): 563–83.
47 Habermas. op. cit. note 11, p. 63.
48 Ibid: 52.
49 Ibid: 34–35.
50 Ibid: 43.
51 Ibid: 31.
52 Here wemust note a hermeneutical complexity, this is: what does not
to be disposed over mean? In the English translation of The Future of
Human Nature it is not completely clear what should we make of such a
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maintain a liberal position regarding abortion, and at
the same time a conservative position regarding the
destruction of human embryos for medical research.
Abortion is morally permissible because it just destroys
human embryos, whereas medical research on human
embryos uses them and thus is morally impermissible.
If we grant Habermass point and accept that human
embryos can be destroyed but cannot be disposed over
(that is, cannot be used), then we have also to accept
that we should rule out PNT as morally permissible.
Because PNT requires that we dispose over (i.e. use) the
embryo produced with the donors egg and fathers
(donors) sperm. We dispose over this embryo in that we
use its biological parts, while destroying it, for the sake
of the intending mothers reproductive project. This
being the case, we need to conclude that from a Haber-
masian perspective PNT is morally impermissible,
because it requires that we dispose over (or use) a
human embryo in order to benefit the intending mother.
MSTpg, on the other hand, is immune to this issue given
that is occurs at the gametic stage and thus we do not
dispose over any human embryo.53 This means that from
a Habermasian perspective on MRTs only MSTpg is
morally permissible.
CONCLUSION
In this article I investigated the ethics of MRTs from a
Habermasian perspective. The first step was to classify
MST and PNT either as therapy or enhancement. I con-
cluded that PNT is a form of prenatal genetic therapy
and thus it is morally permissible according to this
standard. MST, on the other hand, should be divided in
two: MSTpg and MSTwps. MSTpg can also be regarded
as a form of prenatal genetic therapy given that the iden-
tity of the future human is fixed by virtue of the preselec-
tion of a sperm and an egg for the reproductive purpose,
when the preselection is made before any procedure takes
place and before we even consider carrying out the proce-
dure. On the other hand, MSTwps cannot be regarded as
genetic therapy given that there is no one to be healed.
MSTwps is a type of creation act that falls within a cer-
tain definition of negative eugenics, not discussed by
Habermas.
The second step was to examine if the kind of evils
PNT and MSTpg would prevent passed Habermass
threshold of moral permissibility for prenatal genetic
therapeutic interventions. Both PNT and MSTpg did not
pass the threshold of moral permissibility, when moral
permissibility is established solely at the point of prevent-
ing extreme evils. They did not pass it because mtDNA
diseases do not always manifest in the same ways and
thus we are unable to predict if MSTpg or PNT would
prevent an extreme, moderate, or mild evil. But, on the
other hand, both MSTpg and PNT pass the threshold
when we adopt an alternative position regarding the
moral permissibility of prenatal therapeutic interventions.
According to the latter position, an intervention is
morally permissible if it prevents unmistakeable evils
likely to be rejected by all.
As a third step I investigated if we could presume con-
sent for carrying out MSTpg and PNT. In this case there
were also two positions. According to the first position
we cannot presume consent for carrying out MSTpg and
PNT, because it is not certain that they will prevent
extreme evils. The second position, which seems more
tenable, maintains that if the interventions are guided by
the logic of healing and they aim at making provisions
for a healthy life then we can presume consent. If we
endorse the second position then it follows that we can
in fact presume consent for MSTpg and PNT, given that
they are guided by the logic of healing and they aim at
benefiting the health of the future second person.
Finally, I examined Habermass stance on the value of
human embryos and how this relates to MRTs. I con-
cluded that while MSTpg would be morally permissible
PNT would not. PNT would not be morally permissible
because it requires that a human embryo is disposed
over, in order to benefit the intending mothers reproduc-
tive project. On the other hand, MSTpg is morally per-
missible because it takes place at the gametic stage and
thus it does not require a human embryo to be disposed
over.
At this point it must be clear that during my assess-
ment of MRTs I considered these techniques as finished,
by which I mean that they are already available in clini-
cal practice and that their research and development
phase has long passed. If we do not consider them as fin-
ished, but as techniques that are currently under develop-
ment, then a further fatal complication must be noted:
MST research requires the destruction of human
embryos. MST research requires the destruction of
human embryos because in order to establish if the tech-
nique is effective scientists need to perform MST and
then create embryos only for the purpose of researching
upon them, for example in order to investigate embryo
development post-MST. And after such research ends
these embryos will be discarded. This means, at this
point in time and from a Habermasian stance, that we
also need to reject MSTpg: given that current research on
MST disposes over human embryos.
phrase. The German word unverf€ugbar can, alternatively, be translated
as unavailable but even if we do so its meaning remains unclear. In this
context unverf€ugbar seems to better translate as not to use/not to
access.
53 It is true that someone could reject Habermass account of the value
of human prepersonal life, endorse a liberal stance regarding the
destruction of human embryos, and hold a Habermasian stance in
regards to prenatal genetic interventions.
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Now, the above conclusions are relevant for bioconser-
vatives who follow Habermas in two ways. The first one
is that if they want to be morally consistent, as a matter
of personal morality, then in the actual state of affairs
they should reject all MRTs at this point. This conclu-
sion is particularly interesting because in principle
MSTpg could be regarded as morally permissible, but
the conditions for this to be the case are almost impossi-
ble to attain. The second way in which these conclusions
are relevant for such bioconservatives is that they should
inform what kind of legislation they should support
when developing regulations on MRTs. If bioconserva-
tives think that public policy regarding new reproductive
techniques should follow ethical analysis then, at this
present moment, they should oppose and try to block
any legislation that would approve the use of MRTs,
such as the one recently passed in the UK. Finally, in a
debate where the bioconservative positon has been pre-
sented as na€ıve and rabidly anti-biotechnological, my
findings show that the reasons a Habermasian account
has to reject MRTs are complex and varied in nature.
This means that there is no single silver bullet for taking
down Habermass position, but that we should seek to
engage with each identified independent reason for
rejecting MRTs.
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